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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State in this case has conceded at least two trial errors identified by
Ms. Satcher in this appeal, and has failed to fully argue the substantive merits of a third.
First, the State has conceded that it was error for the district court to permit the State to
present the testimony of a law enforcement officer that, in his expert opinion,
Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the underlying offense. The State has
also conceded that it was error for the district court to permit the introduction of
evidence of a prior restitution order against Ms. Satcher as a prior felony conviction
under I.R.E. 609. The State's sole contentions on appeal with regard to these errors is
that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Reply Brief is

necessary, both to clarify the pertinent standards governing this Court's review for
harmless error and to clarify that, under the facts of this case, neither errors standing
alone is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State also erroneously suggests that the prosecutor's misconduct in seeking
to admit the expert opinion testimony of a law enforcement officer as to Ms. Satcher's
truthfulness is somehow rendered sanctionable because the district court failed to
recognize that such testimony invades upon the province of the jury.

This claim is

directly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. Because the minimal argument
provided by the State is without support in the case law, Ms. Satcher asserts that the
prosecutor in this case committed misconduct. Moreover, the State has failed to argue
that this misconduct is harmless.

Because it is the State's burden to establish the
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harmlessness of objected to prosecutorial misconduct, and because the State has
waived any argument as to harmlessness in this case, prejudice must be presumed.
This Reply Brief is additionally necessary to clarify that, under the pertinent
standards for cumulative error review, the aggregate effects of the trial errors in this
case require reversal.
Finally, while Ms. Satcher continues to assert that the State's evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction for grand theft, she will not reiterate her arguments
herein, but will instead rely upon the arguments contained within the Appellant's Brief in
this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Satcher's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES

1.

Has the State failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district
court's error in permitting a law enforcement officer to present his "expert"
opinion testimony that Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the
charged offense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

2.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he intentionally elicited testimony
from one witness regarding his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying
guilt of the charged offense?

3.

Has the State failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district
court's error in admitting evidence in the form of a restitution order under the
auspices of I.RE. 609 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

4.

Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Has Failed To Establish, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The District
Court's Error In Permitting A Law Enforcement Officer To Present His "Expert" Opinion
Testimony That Ms. Satcher Was Lying When She Denied Guilt Of The Charged
Offense Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
A.

Introduction
The State has conceded error in the trial court's failure to sustain Ms. Satcher's

objections to the prosecutor's elicitation of "expert" testimony of a law enforcement
officer as to his opinion regarding Ms. Satcher's truthfulness when she denied guilt of
the charged offense.

As such, the sole issue for this Court regarding this claim is

whether the State has established that this error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because the State has not done so, Ms. Satcher asserts that reversal of her
conviction is required.

B.

The State Has Failed To Establish, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The
District Court's Error In Permitting A Law Enforcement Officer To Present His
"Expert" Opinion Testimony That Ms. Satcher Was Lying When She Denied Guilt
Of The Charged Offense Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
As has been noted, the State has already conceded that it was error for the trial

court to have permitted the prosecutor in this case to question a law enforcement officer
regarding whether, in his expert opinion, Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of
the charged offense. Therefore, the remaining question for this Court on this issue is
whether the State has established that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ms. Satcher submits that the State has not done so.
The State presents three main arguments in an attempt to establish that this
error was harmless. First, the State claims that, "the jury already knew or would have
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surmised that Detective Kendall did not believe [Ms.] Satcher's exculpatory version of
events." The State bases this claim on the fact that the detective, "was a witness
against her," positing that this "would have informed any rational jury that the detective
did not accept her exculpatory version of events as truthful." (Respondent's Brief, pp.910.)
This argument is without support in the law. It is not an implied premise, or part
of the function of the presentation of testimony from any witness, that the witness
harbors any particular belief as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence permit two general types of evidence to be
presented by witnesses - expert testimony and lay witness testimony. See I.R.E. 701,
702. However, the case law is clear as to both types of testimony - in neither case can
a witness express an opinion as to the truthfulness of another's testimony, nor can they
express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., State v. Christiansen, 144
Idaho 463, 468-469 (2007); State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003). Because it is
unlawful for any witness to expressly state an opinion as to the guilt or the veracity of a
defendant, it would likewise be inappropriate for this Court to assume that any juror
would draw any such inadmissible inference from the mere fact that a witness was
called to testify by the State.
In addition, this argument ignores the fact that this testimony was not presented
merely as the personal belief of Detective Kendall. Rather, the State attempted to cloak
this testimony in the garb of pseudo-scientific expertise - capability that was purportedly
beyond the ken of the normal juror. For example, the prosecutor during Ms. Satcher's
trial asked Detective Kendall a series of questions regarding his "expertise" in reading
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"verbal and non-verbal cues" of those he suspected of criminal activity. (Trial Tr., p.316,
L.1 - p.323, L.15.)

The officer likewise emphasized his participation in "countless"

interviews, telling the jury that, as part of his training, he has watched many other
interviews and been trained as to specific physical and other cues that indicate a person
is lying. (Trial Tr., p.316, L.24-p.317, L.18.)
In doing so, the prosecutor was seeking to have the jury defer to this testimony in
presenting the detective as the equivalent of a human lie detector.

This point was

brought home through the manner in which the prosecutor framed his questions of
Detective Kendall. Every time the prosecutor asked the detective regarding his opinion
of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying guilt, or responded to Ms. Satcher's objections
to doing so, the prosecutor emphasized in the presence of the jury the detective's
purported specialized expertise in making such determinations.

The prosecutor's

remarks on this issue included the following:
Sir, based on your training and experience as a detective in
interrogations, was Ms. Satcher being truthful?
... that's why we asked the questions leading up to what his training and
experience was; he holds an advanced certificate, he -- he does
significant training in this area of interrogation, what cues, verbal
and nonverbal cues he looks for
Detective, you talked about some of the training and experience you
have in -- in performing interrogations in the years you've been a
detective. Based on that training and experience, were you able to
form an opinion as to whether Ms. Satcher was being truthful to -- with you
during the state -- with the statements that she made to you during her
interrogation with you?
... this person, Detective Kendall, qualifies as an expert regarding
those cues, and nonverbal cues, and those things that he can point
to in determining whether a person is being truthful with him during
an interrogation.
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Trial Tr., p.320, L.5 - p.322, L.22 (emphasis added).
Each of these repeated statements regarding Detective Kendall's purported
specialized abilities to detect when a suspect is lying was made in the presence of the
jury. Because the prosecutor presented the officer's belief in the packaging of expert
testimony, and presented Detective Kendall's qualifications for detecting truth as
somehow beyond that of the average juror, there is every probability that the jurors in
Ms. Satcher's case would defer to that purported expertise.
The State's second argument as to why this Court should find this error harmless
is that the prejudice of the detective's testimony was cured by a general jury instruction
presented at the close of evidence that indicated that the jury was entitled to make its
own evaluation of the evidence. (Trial Tr., p.643, Ls.3-25.) However, this argument is
unavailing for two reasons. First, this was a general evidentiary instruction that was not
presented in order to provide any limitation regarding the jury's consideration of the
"expert" testimony presented by Detective Kendall and was not given to the jury until
after the State had fully rested its case. In fact, this same instruction empowered the
jury to consider all of the evidence that the court permitted to be introduced at trial.
(Trial Tr., p.643, Ls.3-5.)
Which leads to the second, and more important, reason why the jury instructions
did not cure the prejudice of Detective Kendall's improper testimony at trial. The State's
argument ignores that the district court expressly ruled - in the presence of the jury that the detective's testimony as to Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying guilt was
something that the jury specifically could consider in its deliberations at trial.
Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.10.)

(Trial

In the face of a specific ruling that this improper
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testimony could actually be considered by the jury at trial, the more general instruction
limiting the jury's consideration to the evidence actually presented at trial would have no
mitigating effect at all.

The court informed the jurors that they could consider this

evidence, and did nothing in its instructions that would otherwise indicate that they could
not - or should not - credit the officer's "expert" opinion as to Ms. Satcher's truthfulness
and guilt of the charged offense.
Finally, the State asserts that the evidence in this case was "overwhelming," and
therefore the error in the admission of Detective Kendall's improper testimony was
harmless.

As an initial matter, the State appears to misapprehend the pertinent

standard for this Court's review of harmless error. First, the State's argument focuses
on whether "the evidence of [Ms.] Satcher's untruthfulness was overwhelming."
(Respondent's Brief, p.11 (emphasis added.)) However, under the test articulated by the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, the test is whether the State's evidence
regarding the charged offense was both overwhelming and uncontested.

State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222-223 (2010).

Second, the State's argument as to harmlessness flips that actual standard of
this Court's review. The State, in this case, is essentially asserting that, because a juror
could have still voted to convicted Ms. Satcher under the remaining evidence, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) However,
this is not the appropriate standard of review.
In Perry, this Court adopted the harmless error standard from Chapman v.
California 1 for all objected-to errors at trial. Perry, 150 at 222. This standard places the

1

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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burden on the State to establish that the error at trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, meaning generally that "the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In applying this
standard, however, the Chapman Court did not look to whether the jury, in absence of
the error, could have nevertheless convicted the defendant.

Rather, the Chapman

Court directed its attention to whether a reasonable juror could have acquitted the
defendant in absence of the error:
... though the case in which this occurred presented a reasonably strong
'circumstantial web of evidence' against petitioners, it was also a case in
which, absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fairminded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts.
Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that
the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute
to petitioner's convictions.
Id. at 25.

The State in this case cannot establish that no rational juror would have acquitted
Ms. Satcher.

This is because the State's evidence in this case was neither

overwhelming, nor uncontested, as to her charged offense of grand theft. As was noted
in the Appellant's Brief, the only factual account of what transpired after Ms. OstolasaMendiola misplaced her purse came from 1\/ls. Satcher herself - and her version of
events was entirely consistent with the other evidence presented by the State at trial.
(See Appellant's Brief, p.26.) The State had no direct evidence that Ms. Satcher was
aware of Mr. Miner's use of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card, and no evidence that
she harbored any intent to appropriate the credit card for his use.

The sum and

substance of the State's whole case was entirely circumstantial.

Under these

circumstances, particularly when the jury's evaluation of Ms. Satcher's credibility in
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denying guilt was central to the jury's determination of guilt, this error cannot be said to
have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

11.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony From
One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In Denying Guilt Of
The Charged Offense
A.

Introduction
The State's assertion that, because the district court erroneously admitted

improper opinion testimony from Detective Kendall, there could not also be a finding of
prosecutorial misconduct based upon the intentional elicitation of that testimony is
directly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, and therefore is without merit.
Additionally, the State has failed to argue that this misconduct was not prejudicial. In
failing to do so, the State has waived any argument regarding the prejudice flowing from
the misconduct in this case.

In light of this, Ms. Satcher asserts that reversal of her

conviction of grand theft is required.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony
From One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In
Denying Guilt Of The Charged Offense
The State's sole argument regarding Ms. Satcher's assertion of prosecutorial

misconduct is contained entirely within a footnote in the Respondent's Brief.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1.) In this footnote, the State asserts that, because the trial
court erroneously admitted improper opinion testimony from Detective Kendall, there
was no misconduct. This argument misconstrues the Idaho Supreme Court's Opinion in
Christiansen, and ignores the Court's Opinion in State v. Ellington regarding this issue.
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From the outset, the State's argument is directly contrary to the recent Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011). In Ellington, the
defendant challenged, inter alia, the district court's erroneous admission of a police
officer's expert opinion testimony that the defendant acted intentionally when he struck
the alleged victim with his truck. Id. While the Ellington Court found that the admission
of this evidence by the district court was error, the Court further noted that it would have
also found the presentation of this testimony to also be prosecutorial misconduct:
Trooper Daly gratuitously and unnecessarily injected his clearly
inadmissible opinion that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally. Not only was
his answer an inadmissible intrusion into the jury's domain of determining
the defendant's state of mind, it was also completely unsolicited and
wholly unnecessary. As an officer of the State, Trooper Daly's gratuitous
and prejudicial response is imputed to the State, whether or not the State
intended to elicit that response. Had Mr. Ellington raised this issue as
another instance of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we would
have found, once again, that the State's conduct was improper.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67.

As was the case in Ellington, it is uncontested in this case that the district court in
this case erroneously admitted improper opinion testimony from a law enforcement
officer that was clearly inadmissible because it invaded upon the province of the jury.
But the Ellington Court did not find that the district court's admission of this evidence
precluded a finding of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the elicitation or
presentation of such testimony. The Court found the opposite - had the issue been
raised as prosecutorial misconduct in addition to challenging the testimony as
evidentiary error, the Ellington Court would have found the prosecutor to have
committed misconduct regarding the challenged testimony as well.
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In addition, the State's limited argument on this issue ignores that the prosecutor
has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to his or her right to a fair trial. In
the words of the Christiansen Court regarding this issue:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted
to the jury. They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see
how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because]
generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the
accused." Prosecutorial misconduct includes asking questions where the
answer is inadmissible, but the jury can infer what the answer would have
been simply from the question asked.
Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In the State's footnote on this claim of error, the State suggests that the
Christiansen Opinion limited a finding of misconduct only to cases where the prosecutor

asks questions, "as a way of circumventing either the rules of evidence or judicial
rulings."

(Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1 (emphasis in the original.))

What is clear,

however, from the above-quoted passage from Christiansen is that even attempting to
skirt upon the bounds of inadmissible testimony is improper, regardless of whether the
trial court erroneously sanctions the prosecutor's misconduct through an improper
ruling. See Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469. It is undisputed that the officer's testimony
regarding his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying guilt was plainly improper.
(See Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Under well-established case law, the solicitation of this
evidence by the prosecutor was misconduct as well.
At base, the State's argument regarding misconduct appears to confuse
evidence that was erroneously admitted by the trial court with evidence that is actually
admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
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Because an erroneous ruling admitting

evidence that is plainly improper does not preclude a finding of misconduct, the State's
assertion that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct is without merit.

C.

The State Has Failed To Make Any Argument On Appeal That The Prosecutorial
Misconduct In This Case Was Harmless, Thereby Waiving Any Such Argument
On AppeaL And Prejudice Must Therefore Be Presumed By This Court
It is undisputed that,

prosecutor's

because Ms.

Satcher objected

improper questioning of Detective

Kendall

repeatedly to the

as to his opinion of

Ms. Satcher's guilt and truthfulness, the State bears the burden on appeal to establish
that this misconduct is harmless.

See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. However, case law

from the Idaho Supreme Court demonstrates that the failure of the State to argue
harmlessness waives any claim of harmless error on appeal and, in such cases,
prejudice is presumed. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,471 (2010).
In Ruiz, the Court found that it was error for the district court to exclude otherwise
relevant evidence without conducting the required balancing test contained within I.R.E.
403. Id. After finding error, the Ruiz Court noted that, "The State has not argued that
the error was harmless," and thereafter vacated the defendant's judgment of conviction
without any further consideration as to whether the error was harmless. Id.
The same circumstances with regard to the failure of the State to make any
argument regarding prejudice are present in this case. The State's footnote addressing
the claim of prosecutorial misconduct in this case contains no argument at all regarding
prejudice. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 n.1.) As such, the State has waived any such claim
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and this Court should reverse Ms. Satcher's conviction for grand theft based upon the
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred in this case. 2

111.
The State Has Failed To Establish. Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The District
Court's Error In Admitting Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution Order Under The
Auspices Of I.R.E. 609 Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

A.

Introduction
The State has conceded error in the district court's admission of evidence of a

prior restitution order jointly entered between Ms. Satcher and Robert Minor as a prior
felony conviction under I.RE. 609. The sole contention raised by the State on appeal is
that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ms. Satcher asserts that the
State has failed to establish harmless error.

B.

The State Has Failed To Establish, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. That The
District Court's Error In Admitting Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution Order
Under The Auspices Of I.RE. 609 Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State has conceded that the district court's admission of evidence indicating

a joint restitution order as a result of a criminal conviction for a purpose other than
Ms. Satcher's general credibility under I.R.E. 609 was error. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.)
While the State claims that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
Ms. Satcher asserts that the State's arguments in this regard are without merit.

2

Ms. Satcher further asserts that the State could not have established, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the misconduct in this case was harmless even if the State had
elected to argue this issue for the reasons set forth more fully in her Appellant's Brief.
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.26, 31.)
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The State asserts that, because Ms. Satcher did not contest the fact that she had
a prior felony conviction under I.R.E. 609, this somehow renders admission of evidence
of a joint restitution order entered against both her and Mr. Minor non-prejudicial.
(Respondent's Brief, p.15.) This argument ignores two salient considerations.
First, admission of a prior felony conviction under I.R.

609 is limited to issues of

the general credibility of a witness, and the specific circumstances underpinning that
conviction are expressly prohibited from being injected into the evidence under this rule.
See I.RE. 609(a).

In putting into evidence the restitution order resulting from this

conviction, the district court not only violated the basic terms of I.R.

609, but placed

into evidence the circumstances underpinning this conviction to the extent that it
revealed to the jury that Ms. Satcher was found to have on a prior occasion engaged in
unidentified criminal activity with Mr. Minor for which she faced criminal liability. This
tended to demonstrate nothing more to the jurors than that Ms. Satcher had a
propensity to engage in criminal activity with Mr. Minor, as she was alleged to have
done in this case, and this is sufficient prejudice to render the admission of the
restitution order reversible.

See also State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-384

(1993).
Second, the State's argument that, because this evidence was irrelevant to the
charges levied against Ms. Satcher, it could not have been prejudicial is contrary to the
case law. Prior cases recognize that the presentation of irrelevant evidence can, and is,
in some cases highly prejudicial to the defendant. For example, the Court in Ellington
found that the prosecutor's improper questioning of a witness was designed to illicit
testimony that was both irrelevant to the charges that the defendant was facing and
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simultaneously prejudicial to the defendant. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61 (finding that the
improperly admitted testimony, "was undoubtedly both gratuitous and prejudicial to the
defendant").

Likewise, the Court in Fernandez held that the other-acts evidence

presented at trial was not relevant to the charged offense, but that it carried with it such
a potential for prejudice that the admission of the evidence was reversible error.

Fernandez, 124 Idaho at 383-384. Given this, the State's suggestion that admission of
evidence that is irrelevant to the charged offense is harmless for the reason of its
irrelevant nature is not well-founded.

IV.
The Cumulative Error Doctrine Requires Reversal In This Case
Finally, the State concedes in this case that more than one error was present in
Ms. Satcher's case, and therefore the cumulative error doctrine is applicable to this
Court's review. However, the State's arguments as to why the aggregate effects of the
errors in this case would not require reversal are without support in the case law.
The State suggests to this Court that it will only review the aggregate effect of
trial errors where, "the errors would result in prejudice that would have a cumulative
effect." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.)

To the extent that the State is arguing that the

errors must have to be of the same type or nature in order for this Court to review the
aggregate effect of the error, this claim is without any substantiation in the case law, nor
is any provided by the State. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 265 (1996) (a party
waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking).
According to those cases setting forth the standard for cumulative error, the
reviewing court looks to the aggregate effects of multiple errors, regardless of whether
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the trial errors were of the same general type. See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
572-573 (2007). For example, in Field, the Court found error in the trial court's joinder
of two offenses, admission of improper hearsay, admission of prior bad acts evidence,
and further found prosecutorial misconduct

Id. at 565-572.

These were disparate

errors that were not all logically interconnected. Yet, the Fielding Court found that the
aggregate prejudicial effect of these errors warranted reversal under the cumulative
error doctrine, regardless of whether these errors were interrelated.

Id. at 572-573.

The State's contrary suggestion that this Court must find some interconnectedness
between the aggregated errors is without support in the case law.
In addition, Ms. Satcher reiterates her prior assertion that these errors are related
in that all of the trial errors that occurred in her case had direct bearing on the fairness
of the proceedings.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.38-39.) This is the sole interrelation

required in order for this Court to reverse under the cumulative error doctrine. While
Ms. Satcher continues to assert that each of the errors in her case warrant reversal
standing alone, she further asserts that, under the cumulative error doctrine, reversal is
required.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her conviction for grand
theft with prejudice in light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to support this
charge. In the alternative, Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
judgment of conviction and sentence for grand theft and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2012.

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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